Abstract. Network security is considered one of the obstacles that prevent the wide deployment of ad-hoc wireless networks. Among many security problems, authentication is the most fundamental problem that has to be solved before any others. Some previous solutions requiring centralized entities were not scalable and others requiring physical encounter took a long time. We propose a new architecture, called the Secure Overlay Network (SON), for fully distributed authentication. The SON has scalability because it is constructed in a self-organizing manner. The SON also has NPC-reachability which makes the SON robust against Sybil attacks, and guarantees authentication service between any two nodes in the SON. Both NPC-reachability and simulation results confirm the effectiveness of our architecture.
Introduction
Network security consists of several services such as authentication, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, and access control. Among these services, authentication, which ensures the true identities of peer nodes, is the most fundamental service because other services depend on the sure authentication of communication entities. However, authentication in ad-hoc networks is considered to be more difficult than that in wired networks due to the limited physical protection of broadcast medium, the frequent route changes caused by mobility, etc.
Conventional wired networks mainly use a globally trusted Certificate Authority (CA). Each node is assumed to know the predetermined CA and a node registers its public key to the CA. The CA signs and issues a certificate of the subscribed node. This signed certificate ensures that the node uses the correct public key. The architecture requiring a CA can offer powerful security solutions to several network areas, but is not quite a suitable solution for ad-hoc wireless networks, which have no support of any infrastructure. Nevertheless, a CA can be applied to large ad-hoc wireless networks in a distributed manner [1, 2, 9] while there are still issues about service availability, robustness against attacks, and scalability.
We propose a new architecture for authentication in ad-hoc networks called the Secure Overlay Network (SON). Based on Threshold Cryptography [10] , it offers better fault tolerance than other mechanisms based on non-threshold cryptography since no single entity is entrusted to perform the whole security task. The SON has three beneficial properties. First, it has scalability because it is designed in a fully distributed manner; there are no any central points such as a CA server even during the bootstrapping phase of ad-hoc networks. Second, it has availability because it is robust against up to m − 1 Sybil attackers [4] . Finally, compared with authentication solutions [3, 8] that do not guarantee authentication service between any two nodes even in the same secure domain, our architecture assures any two nodes of their authentication service if they belong to the same secure domain, the SON. Our SON-construction procedures and mobility help to shorten the time necessary for all nodes to join the unified SON.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related works. We will describe how to construct a SON and to provide authentication service over the SON in Section 3. Then we will show you the simulation results in Section 4 and finalize this paper with conclusions in section 5.
Related Works
Several authentication mechanisms for ad-hoc wireless networks have already been proposed. Zhou and Hass [1] identified the vulnerability of using a centralized CA for authentication in ad-hoc networks and proposed a method with multiple CAs based on Threshold Cryptography [10] . These multiple CAs have secret shares of a Certificate Authority Signing Key (CASK) while no CAs individually know the whole complete CASK, which can be known only when CAs of more than m collaborate. Therefore, this method can support the network security against up to m − 1 collaborative compromised nodes. While Zhou and Hass's method improved the robustness of the authentication system, it depended on the offline authority which elects n CAs (n ≥ m) during the bootstrapping phase. Furthermore, it has poor availability because if n − m + 1 CAs have been compromised, uncompromised m − 1 CAs that are left can't provide authentication services anymore.
Kong and et. al. [2, 9] proposed another authentication method based on threshold secret sharing [6] . After the bootstrapping phase, a new node can join the network at any time through self-initialization: it can obtain its own secret share of CASK with the help of m local neighbor nodes. Even though this approach enhances scalability and availability, it still depends on an offline authority during the bootstrapping phase. Furthermore, Narasimha and et. al. [7] pointed out the defect of [2, 9] , that is, secret sharing based on RSA-signature does not provide an important property known as verifiability. They proposed the method for group admission control in peer-to-peer systems which are given a trustable CA. It is based on DSA-signature [11] which has verifiability.
There is another approach on the literature. Habaux and et. al. proposed the scheme based on a chain of public-key certificates [8] , which is scalable and self-organized. However, first of several drawbacks, Habaux's approach does not guarantee authentication service between any two nodes even though they are in the same secure domain, but provides only probabilistic guarantee. There is also a storage problem because each node has to store relatively many other nodes' certificates.
Recently, Capkun and et. al [3] proposed an authentication method and asserted that mobility helps the security. The key idea is that if two nodes are in the vicinity of each other, they can establish a security association (SA) by exchanging appropriate cryptographic material through a secure channel with the short transmission range. However, this direct solution takes a long time because it requires a node to encounter every node that it wants to communicate with.
System Model

Assumptions and Basics of Secret Sharing
We use threshold secret sharing [6, 2] based on RSA signature [5] in our architecture. We assume each node has the same functionality and responsibility, which is suitable for ad-hoc networks. A node i has an RSA private and public key pair (d i , e i ) with modulus n i . Also, node i randomly selects a Lagrange interpolating polynomial of degree m − 1,
is the coefficient of the j th power-monomial of f i (x), so that f i (0) is its private key d i . Node i also issues a raw (or unsigned) Certificate X i in the format of (id, e i , T issue , T expire ), which explains that this certificate was issued at T issue and will expire at T expire .
Our architecture is based on the concept of Neighbors for Authentication (NA); if node i and j establish an NA relationship, they partially attest each other's identity. Establishment of an NA relationship is based on their physical encounter. To support this mechanism, we assume that each device is equipped with some local detection mechanism to identify intruders among its one-hop neighborhood [12] . Suppose node i and j are in the vicinity of each other. If they judge each other to be trustworthy with help of the intrusion detection mechanism, they then exchange their secret shares (P ij = f i (j) mod n i , P ji = f j (i) mod n j ) and NA lists each other through a short range channel such as infrared interfaces. They also establish a symmetry key by means of Diffie-Helmen key exchange. After the exchange of the secret shares and the symmetry key, two nodes become an NA for each other. Nodes which have at least m NAs can organize a SON and an NA relationship represents connectivity over the SON. A node can communicate with its NAs securely regardless of physical topologies because all packets are encrypted by the shared symmetry keys.
The coalition of m NAs of node i can collaboratively restore node i's private key d i like the following equation, but no one alone knows complete d i :
where l ivj (0) are the Lagrange coefficients which are publicly known [2] . Each NA v j can compute SS ivj by means of Lagrange interpolation. SS ivj will be used as a signing key to partially sign node i's certificate.
Intrusion Model and Objective
Giving infinite power to an intruder simply makes any security design meaningless. Kong and et. al. [2, 9] considered a realistic intrusion model in the system: time is divided into intervals of length T and during any time interval T , intruders cannot compromise or control m or more nodes. Once a node is compromised, all the information including its own private key is exposed to malicious intruders. The problem is that gradual break-ins into m nodes over several consecutive time intervals may be possible and therefore long-lived RSA-key pairs are not sufficient. To resist such gradual break-ins, node i has to periodically change its RSA-key pair and reissue its raw certificate X i . If the RSA key pair of a compromised node is changed by a periodic key-changing rule, the node can escape from the control of the intruders. Otherwise, no security mechanisms are robust against gradual break-ins. Compared with proactive secret sharing of [2, 9, 13] which changes secret shares of all nodes, each node over a SON just changes secret shares held by its NAs into secret shares of its new private key. Therefore, this difference makes the SON more scalable than others [1, 2, 7, 9, 13] .
The main objective of this paper is to prevent intruders from joining a SON. Because the intruders can break or control up to m − 1 nodes during any time interval T , the SON has to be robust against the coalitions of up to m − 1 compromised nodes and the intruders.
Primitive-SON and NPC-reachability
A primitive-SON is the smallest SON and is self-organized without the help of an offline authority; this property gives the SON scalability and makes deployment of the SON easier. If a network administrator wants to protect the network against attacks of up to m−1 collaborative compromised nodes, a primitive-SON has to be composed of at least m + 1 nodes. In Figure 1, node A We can easily observe that there are always m NPCs between any two nodes over the primitive-SON. We call this property of the SON NPC-reachability. That is, the primitive-SON is robust against attacks of up to m− 1 compromised nodes. Therefore, we designed the node-joining and SON-combining procedures in order to keep NPC-reachability of the primitive-SON.
Procedure of Node-Joining
A node can become a member of a SON when it has m NAs with any m members of the SON. Suppose non-member node E has already had an NA relationship with node C and D as shown in Figure 1 . Lastly, node E establishes an NA relationship with node A. Then node E solicits node A for a permission to join the SON by asserting its NAs to be the SON-members. In order to confirm this assertation, node A separately requests node C and D to send partial certificates signed by secret shares of node E (X SSEC E , X SSED E ) to itself. Now node A has to examine whether node E has m NAs with m SON-members. Otherwise, the SON is no more NPC-reachable. This examination is very simple because all nodes over the SON trust each other. Sponsor C of node E appends the message authentication code (MAC) of its ID and nonce to X SSEC E using its private key for message integrity. After passing in the integrity check, node A then computes X
, we apply the K-bounded Coalition Offsetting 4 [2] . Node A 4 The computation of m N (mod N ) in K-bounded Coalition Offsetting has extremely computation overhead [7] , therefore, we can adopt DSA signature [11] instead of RSA signature.
If X E and X E are the same, node A can believe node E's identity because at least m SON members have guaranteed node E to be trustworthy. We call this entire process the NPCreachability test.
Finally, node A broadcasts the SON-join message of (E, e E , NA list E ), which informs all members of node E's new join. We use broadcasting rather than unicasting to improve efficiency in terms of bandwidth when there are many SON-members. However, broadcasting is not a reliable method for transmitting control messages; we can adopt Lou's method [14] to improve reliability while maintaining efficiency.
Procedure of SON-combining
Two SONs can be merged into one large SON if there are m distinct NA relationships between the two SONs. In Figure 2 , when node A encounters node E, they exchange SON-member list. Both of them can notice that they belong to the different SON by comparing the SON-member list. If they establish an NA relationship, node A and E broadcast the NA-addition messages of (E, e E , NA list E , SON list E ) and (A, e A , NA list A , SON list A ), respectively. Suppose node B also establishes an NA relationship with node E after receiving the NAaddition message from node A. However, they do not broadcast any NA-addition messages because this NA relationship does not make an additional NPC between two primitive-SONs. Suppose the establishment of the NA relationship between node C and G is the last step to construct the combined SON. At this time, both node C and G confirm the existence of m distinct NAs between their SONs to keep NPC-reachability of the combined SON. They then broadcast the SON-combined message of (m distinct NA pairs, combined SON-member list). The minimum number of broadcasting for SON-combining is just m regardless of the size of SONs: this makes the SON keep scalability. The procedure of SONcombining can accelerate the construction of the unified SON which contains all nodes.
Once the unified SON including all nodes has completely been organized, the SON assures any two nodes of their authentication service because both procedures of node-joining and SON-combining keep the NPC-reachability of SONs and then finally the ultimate unified SON has NPC-reachability. 
Simulations
The dominant time-consuming job is to construct the unified SON. Therefore, the interesting criterion is the time necessary to construct the unified SON. We run a number of simulations using ns-2 simulator with 802.11 MAC and AODV routing protocols. An NA relationship can be established when two nodes are located in close proximity. We use the random walk mobility model with various pause time and maximum speed [3] . First, our architecture is evaluated with 250 x 250, 500 x 500, and 750 x 750 m 2 square area of ad-hoc network. In each case, 50 nodes move around with 0.5 second pause time and 20m/s maximum speeds. The transmission range of the secure channel is 5 meters while that of the data channel is fixed to 250 meters. Figure 3 shows that in case of 250 x 250 m 2 network, three primitive-SONs are created and are merged at around 200 seconds. Because the node density is high, the unified SON is self-organized within about 210 seconds. In case of 500 x 500 m 2 network, four primitive-SONs are initialized at around 220 seconds and the construction of the unified SON takes about 890 seconds. In case of 750 x 750 m 2 network, the first primitive-SON is created at around 830 seconds, and the growth speed is the slowest because of the smallest node density. However, we can observe that the SON growth speeds up in an instant after two small SONs merge at 1170 seconds. Based on these results, we can conclude that the node density is the key factor that determines the period of the SON construction.
To analyze the effect of node mobility into the SON construction time, we perform more simulations with different mobility pattern of 1.5 second pause time and 10m/s maximum speeds. From Figure 4 , high mobility helps to shorten the SON construction time. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a new authentication architecture called the SON for ad-hoc wireless networks. The proposed method can provide authentication services in a fully distributed manner. Because the SON can operate without infrastructures or offline authorities, it is more deployable than the methods proposed in [1, 2, 7, 9] . The SON is also robust against up to m − 1 collaborative compromised nodes and assures any two members of their authentication service if they belong to the same SON. These beneficial properties come from NPCreachability of the SON. We will further devise the compromised node detection mechanism that operates in a fully distributed manner and the procedure of SON-splitting when some nodes leave.
